CWE-287 · CWE-347
## Summary CVE-2026-49283 / GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx ("HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass") was fixed so that `HTTPArtifact::receive()` verifies the embedded SAML `Response` using the IdP metadata signing keys. The current implementation (master `31c72c1d`, released **v6.2.3**) reaches that verification **only when the embedded Response is signed**: ```php // src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php (receive()) if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) { return $samlResponse; // ← unsigned embedded Response returned UNVERIFIED } return $this->verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata); // only runs when signed ``` An attacker who controls one trusted-federation IdP therefore returns a **validly-signed outer `ArtifactResponse`** (signed with their own real key, which passes the mandatory outer check) that **wraps an *unsigned* `<samlp:Response>` whose `<Issuer>` names a *different* IdP**. `isSigned()` is false, so `verifyMessageSignature()` never runs and the forged Response is returned as successfully received. Additionally, even on the signed path `verifyMessageSignature()` verifies against the **artifact issuer's** metadata keys but **never asserts that the embedded Response's `<Issuer>` equals the artifact issuer** — the same cross-IdP confusion the CVE was assigned for is not closed by identity binding. This is an incomplete implementation of the fix's own stated goal ("verify signatures using IdP metadata sign