CVE-2026-110789 — @libp2p/crypto — CWE-130 · CWE-400
CVE-2026-110789 is a HIGH severity security vulnerability (CWE-130, CWE-400) (CVSS 7.5/10 (EPSS: 0.6%)) affecting @libp2p/crypto. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw remotely over the network without authentication (PR:N) with zero user interaction (UI:N), causing high-impact service disruption (A:H).
📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text
### Summary A remote peer can stall a js-libp2p node's entire event loop for ~4–5 seconds per connection (and transiently allocate ~2 GB) by sending a ~15-byte crafted `publicKey` inside an Identify message. The malformed key reaches the DER decoder before any peer-id/signature check, so the attack is pre-auth and repeatable indefinitely by reconnecting. ### Details `packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts` `readLength()` parses DER long-form lengths with no comparison to `buf.byteLength`, and `readInteger()` then loops over the attacker-claimed length: ```ts function readInteger (buf, context) { const length = readLength(buf, context) // attacker-controlled, claims up to 2^64 const end = context.offset + length for (let i = context.offset; i < end; i++) // runs far past buf.byteLength vals.push(buf[i]) // pushes `undefined` past the end } ``` The blob reaches the parser pre-auth: Identify runs on every `connection:open` and calls `publicKeyFromProtobuf(publicKey)` (`packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts:85`) before the `connection.remotePeer.equals(id)` check at `identify.ts:88`. The `MAX_RSA_JWK_SIZE` guard in `pkixToRSAPublicKey` only bounds the total blob size, not the inner length field, so a 15-byte payload defeats it; the ECDSA path (`unmarshalECDSAPublicKey`) has no cap at all. The decode runs in a single synchronous tick, so no `AbortSignal` — including Identify's 5 s timeout — can interrupt it. Verified on js-libp2p comm
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CVE-2026-110789
CVSS 7.5/10 · HIGH · 17.11.2026
CWE: CWE-130, CWE-400
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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🎯 WHAT IS THIS VULNERABILITY?
Summary: ### Summary
A remote peer can stall a js-libp2p node's entire event loop for ~4–5 seconds per connection (and transiently allocate ~2 GB) by sending a ~15-byte crafted publicKey inside an Identify message. The malformed key reaches the DER decoder before any peer-id/signature check, so the attack is pre-auth and repeatable indefinitely by reconnecting. ### Details
`packages/crypto/src/keys/…
Affected: @libp2p/crypto
⚡ ATTACK CHAIN
Remotely over internet | no authentication required | no user interaction | low complexity.
🌍 REAL WORLD IMPACT
Service can be completely taken down.
🛡️ REMEDIATION
→ Apply vendor security update for @libp2p/crypto.
→ Pre-patch: put service behind VPN or apply IP allowlist.
→ Add WAF rule, create IDS alert for anomalous traffic.
⚠️ URGENCY
⚠️ This week (7 days) — High risk, anonymous remote.
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[Kural Tabanlı Otomatik Güvenlik Analizi]