CVE-2026-87039 — CWE-787
CVE-2026-87039 is a HIGH severity Memory Corruption / Buffer Overflow vulnerability (CWE-787) (CVSS 7.8/10) affecting affected software system. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw via local access (AV:L) with low-privileged access (PR:L) with zero user interaction (UI:N), triggering a scope change (S:C) across connected components and resulting in complete compromise of system confidentiality and integrity (C:H/I:H).
📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text
The user-mode syscall verifier z_vrfy_i2s_configure() in drivers/i2s/i2s_handlers.c copies the caller's struct i2s_config in from user memory and then, when cfg->frame_clk_freq is 0 (the API's "unconfigure the stream" request), jumps straight to z_impl_i2s_configure() without performing the K_SYSCALL_OBJ(config.mem_slab, K_OBJ_MEM_SLAB) ownership/type check or the block_size sanity check. The mem_slab field is a struct k_mem_slab *, so on that path a completely unvalidated, user-chosen pointer reaches driver code that is entitled to trust it as a real kernel object. Any thread running under CONFIG_USERSPACE that has access to an I2S device object can trigger this with a single i2s_configure() call. Most in-tree drivers special-case frame_clk_freq == 0 and never store the caller's structure, but drivers/i2s/i2s_litex.c does not: i2s_litex_configure() only logs a warning for a mismatched frame clock, then memcpy()s the caller's config into stream->cfg and marks the stream I2S_STATE_READY. A subsequent i2s_trigger() with I2S_TRIGGER_START enables the FIFO interrupt, and the interrupt handlers i2s_litex_isr_rx() / i2s_litex_isr_tx() then call k_mem_slab_alloc() and k_mem_slab_free() on the attacker-supplied pointer in supervisor context. The result is an arbitrary-pointer read/write primitive executed by the kernel on behalf of an unprivileged thread — k_mem_slab_alloc() takes a spinlock at slab->lock and reads and writes slab->free_list and the link word inside the returned "block" — which defeats the CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation boundary entirely. The same missing validation is a hazard for out-of-tree I2S drivers that retain the configuration on the unconfigure path. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are unaffected, since the verifier is not used. The fix zeroes config.mem_slab and config.block_size on the unconfigure path so the driver can never receive an unvalidated pointer, while still allowing a stream to be unconfigured by a caller that does not own a memory slab, as the API documents.
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CVE-2026-87039
CVSS 7.8/10 · HIGH · 04.11.2026
CWE: CWE-787
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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🎯 WHAT IS THIS VULNERABILITY?
Buffer Overflow / Memory Corruption
Summary: The user-mode syscall verifier z_vrfy_i2s_configure() in drivers/i2s/i2s_handlers.c copies the caller's struct i2s_config in from user memory and then, when cfg->frame_clk_freq is 0 (the API's "unconfigure the stream" request), jumps straight to z_impl_i2s_configure() without performing the K_SYSCALL_OBJ(config.mem_slab, K_OBJ_MEM_SLAB) ownership/type check or the block_size sanity check. The m…
⚡ ATTACK CHAIN
1. Fuzz with Boofuzz/AFL++ to find crash.
2. Find offset: pattern_create→crash→pattern_offset EIP
3. Control EIP/RIP, bypass NX with ROP chains.
4. ASLR bypass via info leak or brute force.
5. Metasploit: search CVE-XXXX; use exploit/...; run
🔧 Tools: GDB+PEDA/pwndbg, ROPgadget, pwntools, Metasploit, AFL++
🗺️ MITRE ATT&CK: T1203 (Exploitation for Client Execution), T1068
🌍 REAL WORLD IMPACT
All confidential data readable/stealable; data can be modified or deleted; service can be completely taken down; pivot to other systems possible.
🛡️ REMEDIATION
→ Apply the vendor-released patch immediately.
→ Verify ASLR/NX/Stack Canary are active.
→ Add WAF rule, create IDS alert for anomalous traffic.
⚠️ URGENCY
⚠️ Planned maintenance (2 weeks).
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