CWE-22
termux-sync restore trusts fields inside an untrusted backup manifest and uses them as the extraction destination without validation. During restore, each archive entry is handled as: src_dir = Path(info.get("source", ...)).parent extract_archive(archive, src_dir, ...) extract_archive opens the archive and runs tarfile.extract for every member with no path jail and no filter: with tarfile.open(archive_path, "r:*") as tf: for member in tf.getmembers(): tf.extract(member, dest_path, set_attrs=True) There is no check that manifest "source" stays under an expected restore root, that tar members stay inside dest_path, or that backup_name used in temporary paths cannot contain ".." or separators. Impact: A victim who restores a malicious backup (local, shared, or from a compromised GitHub/Google Drive storage backend) can have arbitrary files written anywhere the Termux user can write. Overwriting shell startup files or executable scripts leads to local code execution on later use. Reproduction (benign markers only): 1. Build a backup directory with home.tar.gz (members: proof filename + optional config names) and manifest.json. 2. Set files.home.source to any path whose parent is the desired write directory (e.g. $HOME/dummy_for_parent so parent is $HOME). 3. Run the same extract path the tool uses: src_dir = Path(source).parent; tarfile.extract each member into src_dir. 4. Observe attacker-controlled files created under $HOME and under other chosen r