CWE-918
### Impact Outstatic’s authenticated GitHub REST proxy accepted an unvalidated endpoint parameter and constructed an upstream GitHub API URL by string concatenation while attaching the authenticated user’s GitHub OAuth token. A user with access to the Outstatic dashboard could craft a request that caused the server to send their own GitHub OAuth token to a non-GitHub host. If that token was captured, it could be used to access GitHub resources available to that same user, including private repositories depending on granted scopes. This does not allow unauthenticated attackers to access private repository data, and it does not directly expose another user’s GitHub token without an additional same-origin execution or request-forging primitive. ### Patches The issue has been patched by validating that proxied requests resolve to the exact https://api.github.com/ origin and by restricting forwarded request headers. Users should upgrade to v2.2.1 or later. ### Workarounds If upgrading immediately is not possible, restrict access to /api/outstatic/github to trusted dashboard users only, or temporarily disable the endpoint if it is not needed. As a temporary code-level mitigation, reject body-provided endpoint values that do not begin with /, verify the parsed URL origin is exactly https://api.github.com/, and block forwarding of sensitive headers such as Authorization, Host, and User-Agent. Users who suspect their token was exposed should revoke the affected GitHub OAuth authorization and sign in again.