CVE-2026-63634 — Pympp — CWE-20 · CWE-1286
CVE-2026-63634 is a NONE severity security vulnerability (CWE-20, CWE-1286) (CVSS 0.0/10 (EPSS: 0.3%)) affecting Pympp. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw remotely over the network without authentication (PR:N) with zero user interaction (UI:N), posing a direct security risk to affected deployments.
📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text
### Details When the server acts as the fee_payer, `pympp` 0.8.0 validates calldata using `eth_abi` decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The `FeePayerPolicy` caps `gas_limit` (≤ 2 M) and `max_fee_per_gas` (≤ 100 Gwei) but does **not** check calldata length. Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: **16 gas per non-zero byte**. Appending `N` bytes of `0x01` padding inflates actual gas used by `N × 16` while keeping `gas_limit` and `max_fee_per_gas` within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet. **Vulnerable code path:** `FeePayerPolicy` in `fee_payer_policy.py` (pympp 0.8.0) enforces `maxGas = 2_000_000` and `maxFeePerGas = 100 Gwei` but has no `calldata.length` bound. The policy check passes because the inflated gas comes from intrinsic calldata cost, not the declared `gas_limit`. **Note:** In our experiment, we enforce an 16 KB `max_header_length`, which caps the maximum effective padding at roughly 5,500 bytes. The default padding in this PoC (5,500 bytes) is within that limit. ### PoC The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run: ```bash unzip pympp_python_PoC.zip cd pympp_python docker build -t pympp-padding . docker run --rm pympp-padding ``` There are more details in `pympp_python/README.md` ### Impact In our experiment, a malicious client can force the server to pay ~**5x** the normal
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CVE-2026-63634
CVSS 0/10 · UNKNOWN · 17.11.2026
CWE: CWE-20, CWE-1286
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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🎯 WHAT IS THIS VULNERABILITY?
Summary: ### Details
When the server acts as the fee_payer, pympp 0.8.0 validates calldata using eth_abi decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The FeePayerPolicy caps gas_limit (≤ 2 M) and max_fee_per_gas (≤ 100 Gwei) but does not check calldata length. Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: 16 gas per non-zero byte.
Affected: pympp
⚡ ATTACK CHAIN
Remotely over internet | no authentication required | no user interaction | low complexity.
🌍 REAL WORLD IMPACT
🛡️ REMEDIATION
→ Apply vendor security update for pympp.
→ Pre-patch: put service behind VPN or apply IP allowlist.
→ Add WAF rule, create IDS alert for anomalous traffic.
⚠️ URGENCY
📌 Low priority — routine update sufficient.
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[Kural Tabanlı Otomatik Güvenlik Analizi]