CVE-2026-128088 — Russh — CWE-367 · CWE-863
CVE-2026-128088 is a LOW severity security vulnerability (CWE-367, CWE-863) (CVSS 2.2/10 (EPSS: 0.1%)) affecting Russh. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw via local access (AV:L) with low-privileged access (PR:L) requiring user interaction, allowing unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data (C:H).
📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text
### Summary In russh `0.65.0`, a sign request for a confirmation-constrained key can retain and use the private key after another connection locks the agent. `try_sign()` snapshots an `Arc<PrivateKey>` before awaiting `Agent::confirm()` and does not revalidate the shared lock state after the await. An agent-forwarding peer can therefore obtain a signature while the agent is locked and every new request is being rejected. ### Details The agent's lock and key stores are shared by all connections. `respond()` reads the lock state once, then dispatches a sign request: ```rust let is_locked = { // ... read the shared lock ... }; // ... Some((&13, mut r)) if !is_locked && agentref.confirm_request(MessageType::Sign).await => { let agent = self.agent.take().ok_or(Error::AgentFailure)?; let (agent, signed) = self.try_sign(agent, &mut r, writebuf).await?; ``` In `try_sign()`, russh clones the private key from the shared store and drops the store lock before awaiting the asynchronous confirmation callback: ```rust let key = { let blob = Bytes::decode(r)?; let k = self.keys.0.read().or(Err(Error::AgentFailure))?; if let Some((key, _, constraints)) = k.get(&blob.to_vec()) { if constraints.contains(&Constraint::Confirm) { needs_confirm = true; } key.clone() } else { return Ok((agent, false)); } }; let agent = if needs_confirm { let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await; if !ok {
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CVE-2026-128088
CVSS 2.2/10 · LOW · 13.11.2026
CWE: CWE-367, CWE-863
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
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🎯 WHAT IS THIS VULNERABILITY?
Summary: ### Summary
In russh 0.65.0, a sign request for a confirmation-constrained key can retain
and use the private key after another connection locks the agent. try_sign()
snapshots an Arc<PrivateKey> before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not
revalidate the shared lock state after the await. An agent-forwarding peer can
therefore obtain a signature while the agent is locked and every ne…
Affected: russh
⚡ ATTACK CHAIN
Local/physical access | low-privilege account | user interaction required.
🌍 REAL WORLD IMPACT
All confidential data readable/stealable.
🛡️ REMEDIATION
→ Apply vendor security update for russh.
→ Add WAF rule, create IDS alert for anomalous traffic.
⚠️ URGENCY
📌 Low priority — routine update sufficient.
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[Kural Tabanlı Otomatik Güvenlik Analizi]