CVE-2026-109575 — In HAProxy Data Plane API 2.2.0 — CWE-306
CVE-2026-109575 is a CRITICAL severity Missing Authorization & Access Control vulnerability (CWE-306) (CVSS 9.8/10) affecting In HAProxy Data Plane API 2.2.0. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw remotely over the network without authentication (PR:N) with zero user interaction (UI:N), resulting in complete compromise of system confidentiality and integrity (C:H/I:H).
📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text
In HAProxy Data Plane API 2.2.0 through 3.4.3 (and corresponding Enterprise Edition releases), Server.ConfigureAPI() has process-global authentication logic that improperly drops security controls across multiple transport types. When a TLS Certificate Authority (tls_ca) is configured and a numeric TLS port (tls_port) is specified, the application globally disables Basic authentication on its shared internal request handler. Because this handler is shared concurrently among HTTP, HTTPS, and UNIX domain socket listeners, and mutual TLS (mTLS) client certificate verification (tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert) is enforced exclusively on the HTTPS server path, all other simultaneously active non-mTLS listeners fail open. Consequently, an unauthenticated attacker capable of reaching an affected HTTP or UNIX management endpoint can completely bypass credentials to gain full API administrative access. This allows unauthorized remote or local actors to read sensitive, cleartext HAProxy configuration data or replace the managed configuration entirely via the raw configuration endpoint. This has been fixed in versions 3.4.4, 3.3.9, 3.2.17, 3.0.25, 2.9.29, and their respective EE backports by migrating to a per-request TLS connection-state validation model.
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CVE-2026-109575
CVSS 9.8/10 · CRITICAL · 12.10.2026
CWE: CWE-306
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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🎯 WHAT IS THIS VULNERABILITY?
Authentication Bypass
Summary: In HAProxy Data Plane API 2.2.0 through 3.4.3 (and corresponding Enterprise Edition releases), Server.ConfigureAPI() has process-global authentication logic that improperly drops security controls across multiple transport types. When a TLS Certificate Authority (tls_ca) is configured and a numeric TLS port (tls_port) is specified, the application globally disables Basic authentication on its s…
⚡ ATTACK CHAIN
1. JWT: change alg to none, remove signature.
2. SQL bypass: ' OR '1'='1'-- in login form.
3. Direct API endpoint access without auth headers.
4. Password reset token prediction or race condition.
5. Credential stuffing with default creds.
🔧 Tools: jwt_tool, Burp Suite, Hydra, sqlmap --forms
🗺️ MITRE ATT&CK: T1078 (Valid Accounts), T1110 (Brute Force)
🌍 REAL WORLD IMPACT
All confidential data readable/stealable; data can be modified or deleted; service can be completely taken down.
🛡️ REMEDIATION
→ Apply the vendor-released patch immediately.
→ Add MFA, strengthen sessions, implement rate limiting.
→ Pre-patch: put service behind VPN or apply IP allowlist.
→ Add WAF rule, create IDS alert for anomalous traffic.
⚠️ URGENCY
🚨 NOW (24-48h) — Remote, no-auth, low complexity.
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