BELİRSİZ Güvenlik Açığı
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted gen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both idr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error. u32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle that is already live in the hash table, breaking handle uniqueness within the table's node ID space. The handle was never reserved in ht->handle_idr, so every later error path that does idr_remove(&ht->handle_idr, handle) removes the reservation of a different, live knode, which is then reused — one failed add compounds into further duplicates. The 4095 limit is per (table, bucket) — ht->handle_idr is per hash table and the range is derived from htid (bucketid), so a table with divisor 256 can legitimately hold 256*4095 knodes. The sibling helper gen_new_htid() has the same silent in-band failure: it returns 0 when the tp_c handle pool (1..0x7FF) is full, and u32_init() publishes the root hash table with handle 0 without checking. Two root tables with handle 0 alias in u32_lookup_ht(), allowing cross-tcf_proto knode add/lookup/delete. Add the same exhaustion check that the divisor path already has. Return an error so u32_change() fails with ENOSPC/ENOMEM when the node ID space is exhausted, and so u32_init() fails with -ENOMEM when the hash table ID space is exhausted. The extack message distinguishes pool exhaustion (-ENOSPC) from a transient allocation failure (-ENOMEM). Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_CLS_U32=y (or =m with module loaded) - Create a clsact qdisc on a device, then add 4095 u32 filters with auto-generated handles to fill the node ID space for the root hash table (single bucket). The 4096th auto-handle filter add triggers the duplicate handle (fh 800::fff reused). Reachable at Level 2 (unshare -Urn, namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN). - For gen_new_htid: create 2047 u32 proto entries on the same block to fill the tp_c handle pool, then create one more. The root table gets handle 0 and aliases with other handle-0 root tables.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
CVE-2026-98104
CVSS 0/10 · BELİRSİZ · 25.09.2026
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
🎯 AÇIK NEDİR?
Açıklama: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted
gen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both
idr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error. u32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle
that is already live in the hash table, breaking handle…
⚡ SALDIRI ZİNCİRİ
CVSS vektörü mevcut değil. Üretici dokümanını inceleyin.
🌍 GERÇEK DÜNYA ETKİSİ
🛡️ ÇÖZÜM VE MİTİGASYON
→ Üretici tarafından yayınlanan yamayı uygula.
→ WAF kuralı ekle, anormal trafik için IDS alert oluştur.
⚠️ ACİLİYET
📌 Düşük öncelik — rutin güncelleme yeterli.
────────────────────────────────────────
[Kural Tabanlı Analiz] [💡 config.json dosyasına ai_key (Claude: sk-ant-... veya Groq: gsk_...) ekleyerek gerçek AI analizi kullanabilirsiniz]
[⚠️ AI key mevcut ancak istek başarısız — kural tabanlı analiz kullanıldı]