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CVE-2026-80970

BELİRSİZ Güvenlik Açığı

BELİRSİZ CVSS 0 ⚡ EPSS 0.2% NVD

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]>

Yayınlanma 11.09.2026
ISO Tarih 2026-09-11
Kaynak NVD
EPSS — Exploit Olasılık Skoru
0.2%
30 günlük olasılık
Tüm CVElerin 11. yüzdeliğinde — Bu açığın istismar edilme ihtimali çoğu CVEden yüksek.
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CVE-2026-80970
CVSS 0/10 · BELİRSİZ · 11.09.2026
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🎯 AÇIK NEDİR?
Açıklama: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response

fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies
the whole buffer back to userspace:

buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size;

void *resp __free(kfree) =
kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, b…

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