YÜKSEK Güvenlik Açığı
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a buffer log item's bitmap into the buffer read for that item: memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT), item->ri_buf[i].iov_base, nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT); The destination offset (bit/nbits, from the logged dirty bitmap) and the buffer size (from the logged blf_len) are both attacker-controlled and otherwise unrelated, yet the only thing bounding the copy is an ASSERT(), which compiles away on production kernels. A crafted image logging a small blf_len together with a bitmap bit past the end of that buffer drives the memcpy() past the buffer's allocation, corrupting adjacent kernel heap during mount-time log recovery. This is reachable by anyone who can get a crafted image mounted -- the malicious-filesystem threat model XFS already guards against elsewhere. Turn the ASSERT() into a real XFS_IS_CORRUPT() check that aborts recovery of the buffer with -EFSCORRUPTED, consistent with the validate-and-fail idiom already used in xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer() and xfs_dquot_item_recover.c. xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() therefore becomes STATIC int and its three callers propagate the error. Found and confirmed with KASAN on a CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=n build: the crafted image trips a slab-out-of-bounds write before this change and fails recovery cleanly with -EFSCORRUPTED after it.
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CVE-2026-80536
CVSS 8.4/10 · YÜKSEK · 26.08.2026
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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🎯 AÇIK NEDİR?
Buffer Overflow / Memory Corruption
Açıklama: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap
xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a
buffer log item's bitmap into the buffer read for that item:
memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT),
item->ri_buf[i].iov_base,
nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT);
The destination offset (bit/nbits,…
⚡ SALDIRI ZİNCİRİ
Saldırı adımları:
1. Fuzzing ile çöküş noktası tespit edilir: Boofuzz, AFL++ ile.
2. GDB/PEDA ile offset hesaplanır: pattern create 500 → crash → pattern offset EIP_VALUE
3. Stack/Heap layout analizi.
4. ROP gadget ile NX bypass.
5. Metasploit varsa: use exploit/... ; run
🔧 Araçlar: GDB+PEDA/pwndbg, ROPgadget, pwntools, Metasploit, AFL++
🗺️ MITRE ATT&CK: T1203 (Exploitation for Client Execution), T1068
🌍 GERÇEK DÜNYA ETKİSİ
Tüm gizli veriler okunabilir/çalınabilir; sistem verileri değiştirilebilir/silinebilir; hizmet tamamen devre dışı bırakılabilir.
🛡️ ÇÖZÜM VE MİTİGASYON
→ Üretici tarafından yayınlanan yamayı uygula.
→ ASLR/NX/Stack Canary aktif olduğunu kontrol et.
→ WAF kuralı ekle, anormal trafik için IDS alert oluştur.
⚠️ ACİLİYET
⚠️ Planlı bakım (2 hafta) — Yüksek seviye.
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