CWE-787
The IPv6 neighbor-discovery code in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c processes the 6LoWPAN Context Option (6CO, RFC 6775) carried inside ICMPv6 Router Advertisements. In handle_ra_6co() the 8-bit context_len field is taken directly from the packet and was never bounded to the RFC maximum of 128. The function computes context->context_len / 8 and then performs memset(context->prefix + context_len, 0, sizeof(context->prefix) - context_len), where context->prefix is a fixed 16-byte array. With context_len between 136 and 255 (and the option length field set to 3, which the pre-fix validation accepts), context_len / 8 evaluates to 17..31, so the memset length 16 - context_len/8 underflows the unsigned size_t argument to roughly SIZE_MAX. This produces an unbounded out-of-bounds memset that zeroes kernel memory well past the 6lo context structure. The defect is reachable from unauthenticated, link-local input: any host on the same link can send a crafted Router Advertisement with a 6CO option. The RA handler validates only the option length field before calling handle_ra_6co(), so a single packet triggers the wild write. The code is compiled when CONFIG_NET_6LO_CONTEXT is enabled. The impact is a reliable remote (adjacent) denial of service via memory corruption, with collateral integrity loss as the memset zeroes contiguous memory before the system faults. Router Advertisements are link-scoped and not forwarded, so the attacker must be on the same link (AV:A). The fix rejects any context_len greater than 128 before the length computation.
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CVE-2026-12633
CVSS 8.1/10 · YÜKSEK · 19.08.2026
CWE: CWE-787
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
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🎯 AÇIK NEDİR?
Buffer Overflow / Memory Corruption
Açıklama: The IPv6 neighbor-discovery code in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c processes the 6LoWPAN Context Option (6CO, RFC 6775) carried inside ICMPv6 Router Advertisements. In handle_ra_6co() the 8-bit context_len field is taken directly from the packet and was never bounded to the RFC maximum of 128. The function computes context->context_len / 8 and then performs memset(context->prefix + context_len, 0, si…
⚡ SALDIRI ZİNCİRİ
Saldırı adımları:
1. Fuzzing ile çöküş noktası tespit edilir: Boofuzz, AFL++ ile.
2. GDB/PEDA ile offset hesaplanır: pattern create 500 → crash → pattern offset EIP_VALUE
3. Stack/Heap layout analizi.
4. ROP gadget ile NX bypass.
5. Metasploit varsa: use exploit/... ; run
🔧 Araçlar: GDB+PEDA/pwndbg, ROPgadget, pwntools, Metasploit, AFL++
🗺️ MITRE ATT&CK: T1203 (Exploitation for Client Execution), T1068
🌍 GERÇEK DÜNYA ETKİSİ
Sistem verileri değiştirilebilir/silinebilir; hizmet tamamen devre dışı bırakılabilir.
🛡️ ÇÖZÜM VE MİTİGASYON
→ Üretici tarafından yayınlanan yamayı uygula.
→ ASLR/NX/Stack Canary aktif olduğunu kontrol et.
→ WAF kuralı ekle, anormal trafik için IDS alert oluştur.
⚠️ ACİLİYET
⚠️ Planlı bakım (2 hafta) — Yüksek seviye.
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