CWE-22 · CWE-73
In server mode pgAdmin 4 resolves a server's password file, SSL certificate, key, CRL and SSH tunnel identity file relative to the user's storage directory, but get_complete_file_path() only stripped leading slashes before joining the two. A path such as "../<another user>/.pgpass", set through the server dialog, the REST API or a servers.json import, therefore named another user's file, and connecting used that user's saved passwords, client certificate or SSH key. The sslkeylogfile connection parameter was passed to libpq unchanged, so a path outside storage let libpq create or append a file as the account running pgAdmin. make_conninfo() also quoted connection parameter values but not their names, so a crafted parameter name could smuggle additional keyword=value pairs past these checks. The fix requires the resolved path, with symbolic links followed, to stay inside the user's storage directory or the named shared storage directory, confines sslkeylogfile the same way, and accepts only exact libpq keywords as connection parameter names. A refused path or keyword is reported instead of letting libpq fall back to a default. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.
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CVE-2026-116249
CVSS 8.4/10 · YÜKSEK · 30.10.2026
CWE: CWE-22, CWE-73
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
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🎯 AÇIK NEDİR?
Path Traversal / LFI
Açıklama: In server mode pgAdmin 4 resolves a server's password file, SSL certificate, key, CRL and SSH tunnel identity file relative to the user's storage directory, but get_complete_file_path() only stripped leading slashes before joining the two. A path such as "../<another user>/.pgpass", set through the server dialog, the REST API or a servers.json import, therefore named another user's file, and co…
Etkilenen: pgadmin:pgadmin_4
⚡ SALDIRI ZİNCİRİ
Saldırı adımları:
1. ../../../../etc/passwd ile Linux dosya sistemi okunur.
2. URL encode: ..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
3. Double encode: ..%252F..%252Fetc%252Fpasswd
4. PHP LFI → RCE: Log poisoning ile User-Agent: <?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?> gönderilir.
5. PHP wrapper: php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=config.php ile kaynak kodu okunur.
🔧 Araçlar: LFISuite, ffuf, Burp Suite, dotdotpwn
🗺️ MITRE ATT&CK: T1083 (File and Directory Discovery), T1552 (Unsecured Credentials)
🌍 GERÇEK DÜNYA ETKİSİ
Tüm gizli veriler okunabilir/çalınabilir; sistem verileri değiştirilebilir/silinebilir; diğer sistemlere pivot mümkün.
🛡️ ÇÖZÜM VE MİTİGASYON
→ pgadmin:pgadmin_4 için üretici güvenlik güncellemesini uygula.
→ realpath() ile canonicalize et, whitelist kullan.
→ WAF kuralı ekle, anormal trafik için IDS alert oluştur.
⚠️ ACİLİYET
⚠️ Planlı bakım (2 hafta) — Yüksek seviye.
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[Kural Tabanlı Analiz] [💡 config.json dosyasına ai_key (Claude: sk-ant-... veya Groq: gsk_...) ekleyerek gerçek AI analizi kullanabilirsiniz]
[⚠️ AI key mevcut ancak istek başarısız — kural tabanlı analiz kullanıldı]